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A cura di Elisabetta Magni e Yahis Martari

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

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Indice

Conventionality, deliberateness, and creativity in metaphors: toward a typology of figurative expressions in Latin semantics

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Abstract
Building on recent advances in metaphor theory, this paper discusses some operational criteria that help to identify different types of metaphors whose status is defined by the interaction of three main parameters – conventionality, deliberateness, and creativity – and discusses possible strategies to distinguish one from another in an ancient language such as Latin. The first distinction to make is between conceptual metaphors, that is, recurrent cross-domain mappings that are highly conventional in a particular language, and living, creative metaphors that are the product of authorial inventiveness. The third category includes metaphors that are strategically used *as* metaphors to prompt the reader to think about specific comparisons, or which invite him to take a new, original perspective on the target concept within specific communicative contexts (Steen 2011). Drawing on a corpus-based analysis of all anger terms in Latin, I first discuss some illustrative examples of conceptual, deliberate and novel metaphors, and then reconstruct the historical development of the well-known ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER schema, which serves as a case study to show how consideration of textual and cultural factors can help us gain further understanding of the emergence and conventionalization of metaphorical readings.

1. Conventionality, creativity, and intentionality in metaphors[1]

Since Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) seminal book, it has been generally recognized that metaphors in language are the reflection of metaphor in thought and that, given the all-

[1] This paper has been written as part of the *The Lexicon of Embodied Experience in Latin* Project (see fn. 2). I would like to thank Michele Prandi, Francesca Strik Lievers, and Maria Napoli for stimulating discussions at various stages in its writing. I am also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their comments. Special thanks go to Irene De Felice, who assisted me in carrying out the corpus-based analysis that made this study possible.

pervasive character of metaphorical thinking, metaphors in language are simply ubiquitous. Metaphors arise from general cognitive processes, namely interpreting one thing in terms of another and establishing meaningful projections between organized domains of knowledge. This is basically due to an unconscious and automatic cognitive mechanism, an 'analogical instinct' which is "not just the human urge to seek and compare patterns but to infer abstract concepts from one domain and apply them to another" (Pollack 2014: 19). According to Pollack, this widespread pattern recognition performed by the human brain allows us to make sense of the overwhelming amount of data we deal with in daily life, whereby we resort to analogy with past experiences we have already categorized for easy reference. This kind of analogical thinking is precisely at the heart of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), where metaphors are understood as conventionalized conceptual images that presuppose an association, via comparison, between a source domain and a target domain – the latter being typically abstract and more complex to grasp. Emotions are usually cited as examples, since they are intangible concepts *par excellence* that are essentially known only through introspection and tend to be conceptualized and thus linguistically expressed through a large number of metaphors. For instance, as we will see in the course of this paper, Latin authors often write metaphorically about an abstract emotion like anger: an example is the ANGER IS A WILD ANIMAL mapping, whereby this feeling is reified in terms of a fierce beast (ex. 1) that has to be satiated (ex. 2), tamed and bridled (ex. 3), in order to become domesticated (ex. 4).

(1) *aliquem e sociis, in quem mea **saeviat** ira*
'some one of his friends, against whom my rage might vent itself'[2] (Ov. *met.* 14, 193)

(2) *postquam ira erat **satiata** [...] agro hostium in Boeotiam excessit*
'and after his wrath had been satiated, he retired from the enemy's country to Boeotia' (Liv. 31, 26)

(3) *ratio [...] iracundias semper **domitas** et **in frenis habet***
'Reason always tames anger and holds it under the reins' (Apul. *Plat*. 2, 5, 115)

(4) *rogo, numinis ut laesi fiat **mansuetior** ira*
'I beg to soften the wrath of the injured deity' (Ov. *Tr*. 3, 6, 22-23)

In cognitivist terms, ANGER IS A WILD ANIMAL can be described as a conceptual metaphor, a recurrent cross-domain mapping which is shared by speakers and is highly conventional in the language. As such, metaphorical meanings become part of the consistent lexical senses licensed by a polysemous linguistic expression. For example, in English, a language that features the very same mapping, a verb such as *unleash* can literally mean 'to release from a leash' but also, metaphorically and with regard to an emotion, have the sense of 'to free from control', as in the expression *he unleashed his anger* (Kövecses 2004: 21).

[2] Translations are based on those to be found in the Loeb series, with some modifications in ex. (2) and (8); the exception is ex. (3), where the translation is mine.

However, things do not always work this way. Besides the conceptual instances that conventionalized in a given language, metaphors can also be 'novel', or 'living', that is, original interpretations of meanings that are not listed as distinct senses of words (Prandi 2012, 2017: 180-181). This distinction has a number of theoretical and empirical consequences: a shared conceptual mapping is necessary to license metaphorical extended meanings of polysemous words, whereas living metaphors may be accounted for independently, in terms of linguistic creativity. As Prandi (2017: 183) puts it, "the roots of living metaphors are in linguistic expression; the roots of lexical extensions are in consistent metaphorical concepts". An example of living metaphor is given in (5), where Statius describes horses as 'dressing themselves' with rage. The idea that rage is a garment is original in Latin and not attested elsewhere (whereas it is documented in Ancient Greek: see Cairns 2016).[3] Here, the metaphor of horses putting on human rage is strategically employed to depict the ambiguous relationship between man and beast that is emblematic of the final third of the poem (McClellan 2015: 121).

(5) *corpora ceu mixti dominis irasque sedentum* ***induerint***
'as though their bodies had mingled with their masters and they had put on their riders' rage' (Stat. *Theb*. 8, 392-3)

A first question thus arises at this point: How can we measure and establish the relative degree of conventionality and creativity of metaphors in an ancient language?

A simple answer would be that if a metaphor is (i) used by different authors, (ii) documented in a variety of genres (iii) across a long time span, and (iv) instantiated by a considerable clustering of linguistic expressions denoting the source domain, which are projected onto the target domain, we can conclude that this was an ordinary means that Latin speakers had at their disposal to mentally represent the target concept and talk about it. This is precisely the case with the ANGER IS A WILD ANIMAL metaphor discussed above, first attested in Plautus (3rd cent. BCE) and still in use five centuries later by Apuleius; moreover, it is documented in a variety of genres, ranging from forensic rhetoric to comedy, philosophical dialogues, epic poetry and historiography, to name but a few. In addition, this metaphor is linguistically instantiated by a relatively wide range of expressions. Therefore, it was probably accessible to thought independently of the linguistic expression that encoded it (on this question, see Prandi 2017: 182). For instance, instead of *satiare iram* (cf. ex. 1), Roman authors alternatively shaped the metaphorical concept of 'to satisfy anger-as-animal with food' by means of a set of quasi-synonymic verbs: *alere* (e.g., Cic. *sext*. 82), *pascere* (e.g., Sil. 12, 719), *nutrire* (e.g., Sen. *de ira* 2, 21) and even *praebere alimenta* 'to offer nourishment' (Ov. *met.* 3, 477). In Latin, the use of such verbs with direct objects such as *ira* or *iracundia* is consistent with the symbolic system which speakers presumably relied on in ordinary communication. As Prandi (2012: 149) puts it, in such cases the metaphor is in the history of the relevant words, the figurative sense becomes integrated within its polysemous semantic spectrum, and "in order to understand it, the interpreter has only to master a shared conceptual structure and a shared lexical system". This means that conceptual metaphors do not require any cognitive effort to be used and processed –

[3] A reviewer perceptively pointed out that the Greek figurative pattern may have influenced and inspired Statius in this respect. Needless to say, the influence of Greek models in Latin literary texts is very often possible or documented, as we will see in Section 3 with the discussion of a specific case.

they typically escape our notice and emerge into our linguistic production unconsciously.

Contrariwise, if we consider the passage in (6) we immediately get a very different impression: here, Seneca skilfully deploys a series of metaphors, both conventional and living, that bundle up and cross over into a complex network – a strategic communicative plan that can hardly be unconscious. The author commences his argument with a long simile (*quemadmodum... ita* 'as...so') comparing anger with a plague, thus intentionally drawing the reader's attention to the specific source domain of an unstoppable and dangerous disease. He then continues with a series of metaphors:

(6) ***Quemadmodum adversus pestilentiam*** *nihil prodest firmitas corporis et diligens valetudinis cura—promiscue enim imbecilla robustaque invadit—,* ***ita ab ira*** *tam inquietis moribus* ***periculum est*** *quam compositis et remissis, quibus eo turpior ac periculosior est, quo plus in illis mutat. Sed cum primum sit non irasci, secundum desinere, tertium alienae quoque irae* ***mederi****, dicam primum quemadmodum* ***in*** *iram non* ***incidamus****, deinde quemadmodum nos* ***ab*** *illa* ***liberemus****, novissime quemadmodum irascentem retineamus placemusque et* ***ad sanitatem reducamus****. Ne irascamur* ***praestabimus****, si omnia vitia irae nobis subinde proposuerimus et illam bene* ***aestimaverimus****.* ***Accusanda*** *est apud nos,* ***damnanda****; perscrutanda eius mala et in medium protrahenda sunt; ut qualis sit appareat, comparanda cum pessimis est. Avaritia adquirit et contrahit, quo aliquis melior utatur; ira* ***impendit****, paucis* ***gratuita*** *est.*

'*As* soundness of body and a careful regard for health avail nothing *against the plague*—for it attacks indiscriminately the weak and the strong—*so* calm and languid natures *are in* no less *danger from anger* than the more excitable sort, and the greater the change it works in these, the greater is their disgrace and danger. But since the first requirement is not to become angry, the second, to cease from anger, the third, *to cure* also the anger of others, I shall speak first of how we may avoid *falling into* anger, next of how we may *free ourselves from it*, and lastly of how we may curb an angry man—how we may calm him and *restore him to sanity*. We shall forestall the possibility of anger if we repeatedly set before ourselves its many faults and shall rightly appraise it. Before our own hearts we must *arraign it* and *convict it*; we must search out its evils and drag them into the open; in order that it may be shown as it really is, it should be compared with all that is worst. Man's avarice assembles and gathers wealth for some one who is better to use; but anger *is a spender*—few indulge in it *without cost*' (Sen. *de ira* 3, 5, 2–4)

In this dense excerpt, Seneca illustrates the three main processes one has to go through when dealing with anger: 'not to become angry, the second, to cease from anger, the third, *to cure* (*mederi*) also the anger of others'. Here, the Roman philosopher reinforces the previous idea of a plague and explicitly frames it through a metaphor, ANGER IS A DISEASE, and especially A MENTAL DISEASE one has to recover from in order to regain sanity (*ad sanitatem reducamus*) – nothing particularly original, since on the Stoic account all passions are madness, that is, a form of psychological illness. This metaphor has been creatively moulded by Seneca, who probably drew inspiration from the Stoic perspective – I could not find it in any other author – although Roman readers would probably have found it easy to interpret. At all events, the point to be made here is that this comparison was not conventional and – this is the crucial point – functions as an

attention-getting textual device that sheds lights on a specific perspective on the target domain: anger is a dangerous form of illness that should be *prevented* and *cured*.

Seneca goes on to programmatically describe the development of his argument. His first point is that we should avoid *falling into* anger. Here, he employs two intertwined conventional metaphors whereby anger is conceived of as a liquid disease kept in a container one can fall into, thus instantiating the CONTRACTING A DISEASE IS A FALLING (INTO A CONTAINER) conceptual metaphor, which is widely documented in Latin (Fedriani 2016: 124–125). Secondly, if we happen to fall into anger, we should immediately *free ourselves from* it. This is another very conventional way of speaking about anger in Latin, whereby this feeling is conceptualized AS A HEAVY BURDEN that oppresses the Experiencer, who in turn should try to put it aside and shake it off. Seneca completes his argument with a multi-layered metaphorical image that impinges on two closely related source domains, economics and jurisdiction: we should carefully *aestimare* 'estimate the extrinsic (money) value' of our anger, which is rarely without cost (*impendit, paucis gratuita*); then we should call it to account (*accusanda*), and if necessary sentence it to punishment (*damnanda*). Seneca often resorts to economic and forensic imagery is his works (see, e.g., Armissen-Marchetti 1989: 98–99, Sjöblad 2015: 51–58), but their deployment in the metaphorical conceptualization of anger is again original: with this move, he integrates this specific target domain into an extended conceptual framework that pervades his thought. In actual fact, the thrust of his creative thinking does not rely on the introduction of novel metaphors *per se*, but rather on their organization "into veritable symbolic networks" which can reproduce "the logical relationships that tie together abstract philosophical concepts" (Armissen-Marchetti 2015: 154).

The point of this short digression is that in the passage in (6) Seneca *intentionally* deploys a number of metaphors. Some of them are conventional, some are creatively shaped within his own personal imagery, while others are borrowed from the Stoic tradition and then reworked; however, all of them are *conspicuous* and used *strategically*. They extend over a whole paragraph and structure Seneca's thought with a specific aim: to waken the reader's metalinguistic awareness and thus make him think about the comparisons he skilfully builds up. This dense metaphorical elaboration constitutes a specific *communicative technique* designed to activate his reader's powers of reasoning about specific cross-domain comparisons – which may or may not be part of their shared system of conventional imagery. Following the Deliberate Metaphor Theory (DMT) set out by Steen (2008), I call metaphors used in this way *deliberate*, that is, 'metaphors that are used *as* metaphors', explicitly designed to invite the reader to take an unusual perspective on the target concept. In this respect, they clearly differ from typical conceptual metaphors, which usually go unnoticed, since the receiver has no need to focus particularly on the source domain in the interpretation; he can process them quickly and automatically simply by relying on the shared lexical system of the language. In other words, conceptual metaphors just 'stay on topic', relying on the common way of saying things (Steen 2011). To summarize in the words of Reijnierse (2017: 163), "[w]hereas the focus in CMT is primarily on the linguistic and conceptual dimension of metaphor, DMT is concerned with the special use of metaphor *as* metaphor at the dimension of communication".

Now, speaking of metaphor interpretation *in communication* with regard to an ancient language such as Latin is different from doing so in relation to a contemporary language, because the communicative dimension is known to us solely through written

(often literary) data. Consequently, it is often difficult to reconstruct the context in which they were produced and appreciated, the nature of the target audience and also that audience's level of encyclopaedic knowledge. Bearing these cautionary notes in mind, exploring the communicative function of metaphors to establish their relative degree of conventionality, creativity, and deliberateness in ancient texts is surely an intriguing challenge. Interestingly, some recent works go in this direction with a focus on Ancient Egyptian (Di Biase-Dyson 2020) and Ancient Greek (see van den Eersten 2019 on Herodotus' *Histories*, Ferella 2020 on Early Greek medical treatises, and Egg 2020 on the Pauline epistles). This pool of data, and the relative discussion, however, thus far lacks input from Latin. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to fill this gap by beginning to explore the issue of deliberateness in metaphors as they emerge from Latin literature, ultimately reassessing their communicative function in the (con)text in which they are embedded. I limit my analysis to the semantic area of anger metaphors, which I have investigated in detail in the *Antiquitas* section of the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana latina* corpus as part of a broader project on embodied metaphors in Latin experiential semantics[4] that has been inspired by recent advances in Classical Cognitive Linguistics (Short 2016, Short & Mocciaro 2019). Section 2 briefly overviews the procedures suggested in the literature to identify potential deliberate and conflictual metaphors and discusses their application to Latin. Section 3 presents a case study on the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor in the history of Latin against the theoretical background just discussed. Section 4 concludes the paper and reassesses the implications of the notions of conventionality, deliberateness, and creativity for a corpus-based and text-based approach to Latin metaphors.

2. The issue of deliberateness: signalled metaphors

The procedure of deliberate metaphor identification is based on the analysis of contemporary word meanings as established by means of a large-scale dictionary, theoretically reflecting the mental lexicon of a contemporary language user (Reijnierse et al. 2018: 134). Steen et. al (2010, and subsequent works by his research group) regard any sense description listed in the dictionary for a given word as a conventionalized meaning for that word; by contrast, if a meaning cannot be found in the dictionary, it is considered novel, creative, and a potential candidate for a deliberate metaphor.

Now, as neatly shown by van den Eersten (2019: 32) in relation to Ancient Greek, this procedure presents some problems when dealing with ancient languages, basically because the dictionaries we have at our disposal have not been designed to closely mirror contemporary language use, and because of the difficulties in reconstructing the exact lexical repertoire and encyclopedic knowledge of speakers in different historical periods. Van den Eersten (2019: 33) suggests relying rather on explicit linguistic and textual features, that is, contextual clues that help us identify *signalled*, *novel*, *recurrent* and *extended* metaphors as potential candidates for deliberate figurative uses, ultimately adopting a top-down approach to deliberate metaphor identification. Due to space

[4] *The Lexicon of Embodied Experience in Latin* Project (2019–2021), of which I am principal investigator, has been financed by the University of Genova within a Curiosity Driven funding call for researchers aged under 40. More information is available at www.lexelat.unige.it.

constraints, in this paper I will focus on the first two categories, as they seem more relevant to the corpus-based analysis of Latin metaphor being carried out in the current research project. In this section I focus on signalled metaphors, while in § 3 I discuss the role of creativity.

The first strategy to explicitly mark a metaphor as such is a meta-linguistic discussion of it. In (7), for example, Seneca discusses with his (imaginary) interlocutor his previous suggestion to call a benefit a *loan*. His interlocutor criticizes Seneca's view, arguing that there is a notable ethical difference between a benefit, which is a good in itself, and a loan, which is not. Seneca justifies his comparison by *classifying it explicitly* as a metaphor:

(7) *'dicitis' inquit 'beneficium creditum insolubile esse, creditum autem non est res per se expetenda.'* ***cum creditum dicimus, imagine et translatione utimur***
'"You say," someone retorts, "a benefit is a loan that cannot be repaid; but a loan is not something that is desirable in itself." When I use the term "loan," I resort to a figure, a metaphor' (Sen. *benef*. 4, 12)

Moreover, also the move of calling into question the metaphorical use of *creditum* is noteworthy in itself. Taking the perspective that is currently being adopted by Steen's research group at the MetaphorLab in Amsterdam, we can consider it as an example of *resistance* to a metaphor. Seneca's interlocutor basically rejects the view that conceptualizes a benefit in terms of a loan because the comparison is fallacious. This offers evidence for a challengeable metaphor in Latin, and the discussion it prompted is a clear sign of how the author was aware of the communicative function it could acquire in a specific discursive context.

More often, however, deliberate metaphors are signalled by textual markers, which explicitly index a comparison being drawn between two domains (Reijnerse 2017: 76). The first category of such markers includes conjunctions and adverbs that predicate analogy, such as *ut* 'as, like' or *quemadmodum ... ita* 'so...that' (cf. ex. 6), which set up a simile. Actual metaphorical flags, in turn, include *quasi* 'as if' and *ut ita dicam* 'so to speak', frequently used as meta-textual operators warning the reader that the subsequent lexeme requires special interpretive effort to be correctly understood since it features a switch from the literal to the metaphorical plane. An example is (8), where Seneca conceptualizes wisdom as a physical object that can be touched and seen with one's own eyes, prefacing the metaphorical expression *sub ictu* with the incidental insertion of *ut ita dicam*.

(8) *Est adhuc genus tertium eorum, qui sapientiae adludunt, quam non quidem contigerunt, in conspectu tamen et,* ***ut ita dicam****, sub ictu habent.*
'There is still a third class of men, – those who toy with wisdom; they have not indeed touched it, but yet are in sight of it, and have it, so to speak, near at hand.' (Sen. *epist*. 72, § 10)

As Fedriani & Molinelli (2013) argue, *ut ita dicam* can also serve as a hedge, that is, a discourse marker signalling – and softening – the choice of a comparison that is felt to be communicatively compromising in some way. This holds also for *quasi*, as illustrated in (9), where a 'metaphor for metaphor' is prefaced by this conjunction, frequently employed by Cicero to introduce figurative expressions. As Zanker (2016:

184) notes in this regard, Cicero often resorts to such hedges to soften otherwise stark metaphors, "and this may suggest that he was aware of the figurative nature of the language he was employing".

(9) *In qua multi floruerunt apud Graecos, sed Phalereus Demetrius meo iudicio praestitit ceteris; cuius oratio cum sedate placideque liquitur tum illustrant eam* ***quasi*** *stellae quaedam tralata verba atque mutata.*
'There have been many conspicuous examples of this style in Greece, but in my judgement Demetrius of Phalerum led them all. His oratory not only proceeds in calm and peaceful flow, but is lighted up by what might be called the stars of "transferred" words (or metaphor) and borrowed words.' (Cic., *Orat.* 92)

Direct evidence of the pragmatic meaning implied by such markers, designed to soften (*mollire*) a harsh metaphor (*paulo durior translatio*) and make it milder (*mitius*), comes from a passage from Cicero:

(10) *Atque etiam, si vereare, ne* ***paulo durior translatio*** *esse videatur,* ***mollienda est*** *praeposito saepe verbo; ut si olim M. Catone mortuo "pupillum" senatum quis relictum diceret,* ***paulo durius****; sin "ut ita dicam pupillum"* ***aliquanto mitius****.*
'And moreover, if one is afraid of the metaphor's appearing a little too harsh, it should be softened down with a word of introduction, as is frequently done; for instance if in the old days somebody had spoken of the Senate as 'left an orphan' by the death of Marcus Cato, it would have been a little too harsh, whereas 'what I may call an orphan' would have been a little milder' (Cic. *de orat*. 3, 165)

In conclusion, one of the most reliable pieces of evidence we can find when assessing the degree of deliberateness of ancient metaphors is their indexing through metaphorical flags, which typically either soften the comparison, or classify it as a simile (through expressions such as *like*).

However, as Prandi (2017: 170) notes, both these means attenuate the potential of the metaphorical projection. On the one hand, a simile explicitly predicates analogy: saying that anger *is like* a plague is different from stating that anger *is* a plague – anger can be compared to a plague precisely on the presupposition that it *is not* a plague. Mitigation, on the other hand, weakens the predicative commitment and therefore the conceptual conflict it conveys. Moreover, not all living and deliberate metaphors are necessarily signalled – and, if they are not, they cannot be automatically retrieved by searching a corpus for the metaphorical flags one has in mind. The only method to identify them is manual examination of texts, that is to say, consideration of specific instances of figurative expressions in relation to (i) the actual communicative context in which they are embedded, (ii) the figurative imagery of the author, and (iii) the conceptual models characteristic of the relevant literary genre. The next section offers a case study intended to exemplify this approach.

3. The role of creativity: living metaphors and their career

Among the wide range of conceptual metaphors that I have identified as portraying and expressing anger in Latin, which include both cross-culturally common patterns like ANGER IS FIRE, ANGER IS A LOCATION, ANGER IS A MASTER, and more culturally-dependent ones (like ANGER IS A MILITARY FORCE), among many others, I registered the striking absence of perhaps one of the most widely used and best-known metaphors in this semantic domain, namely ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. To be precise, I found two instances of it, as we will see shortly – still, a surprisingly low frequency. This means that this metaphor, which is now an active metaphorical concept in many Indo-European languages (see, e.g., Soriano 2003 on Spanish and English, Constantinou 2014 on English, French and Greek), was not included among the common means Romans had at their disposal to talk about this feeling.

This fact is even more significant since this pattern is generally recognized as having a 'universal' status in view of its biological foundations: the cross-linguistic spread of the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor is due to a metonymic conceptualization of this emotion in terms of its physical symptoms, such as an increase in bodily temperature and heart rate, a sense of internal pressure, often combined with redness in the face area. As Kövecses (2000: 169) shows, these physiological universal effects seem to shape the concept of anger in a similar way across many languages (including Chinese and Japanese, as he documents), but, at the same time, such similar metaphors are given "differentiated specific-level content by particular modes of cultural explanation" in various languages. In what follows I will show that the cultural motivation behind the emergence of this metaphor in Latin rests on the Epicurean and Stoic views of emotions. The corpus-based analysis of all attestations of anger terms (*ira*, *iracundia*, *furor* and *furia*) in the history of this language has revealed that this metaphor is used solely by two authors: Lucretius and Seneca.[5] This can hardly be taken as a mere coincidence, the more so because they share a precise philosophical view of emotions, which, I hope to show, played a substantial role in shaping the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor.

In Epicureanism the understanding of emotion is essentially based on the analysis of its phenomenology, which paves the way for the Epicurean therapeutic approach, designed to reach the state of *ataraxia* that characterizes this doctrine. In short, according to Epicurean theory the soul is a combination of four elements – air, wind, heat and a vague *quarta natura* 'fourth element' – and the relative proportion of their atoms in a person's soul directly influences his temperament. Lucretius illustrates this theory in *De rerum natura* (3, 258–306), pointing out that when the air is in a tranquil

[5] To be precise, I have found two more occurrences in Accius, an early comedian: *cum fervat pectus iracundiae* 'when seethes the breast with anger full' (Acc. 3 R^3) and *heu cor ira fervit caecum, amentia rapior ferorque!* 'Oh! My blind senses seethe with anger! By madness am I borne and hurried on!' (Acc. 443 R^3). Rather than invalidating the general hypothesis suggested here, these passages provide interesting evidence for the possible multiple sources of the same metaphor. The cases found in Accius could indeed be taken as living metaphors, moulded by authorial creativity, which also serve poetic needs (cf. the alliteration *fervit – feror* in 443).

state, the heart is at peace and the facial expression serene (*etiam quoque pacati status aeris ille, pectore tranquillo qui fit vultuque sereno*); by contrast, when we are angry, the heat (*ille calor*) that is in the soul begins to boil over (*effervescit*) in anger:

(11) *Est etiam* ***calor ille*** *animo, quem sumit, in iracum* ***fervescit*** *et ex oculis micat acrius* ***ardor*** [...] ***calidi plus est*** *illis quibus acria corda iracundaque mens facile* ***effervescit in ira***
'The mind has also that heat, which it takes on when it boils in wrath and fire flashes more fiercely from the eyes [...] those whose blazing hearts and irascible temperament readily boil over in anger possess a greater quantity of heat' (Lucr. 3, 288-9; 294-5)

Therefore, the conceptualization of anger in terms of a hot fluid boiling in a container first appears in Latin as scientifically based on Epicurus' materialistic psychology, according to which "a person's mental state is determined by the states of his atoms" (Everson 1999: 553). In other words, for Epicurus, and then Lucretius, anger *really is* a *concrete* hot liquid boiling throughout the body (that is, a container). At first glance, the first, potential instantiation of the metaphor under scrutiny could be taken as a deliberate, living metaphor moulded by Lucretius to conceptualize his idea of anger. Closer inspection, however, reveals that the expression in (11) constitutes for the author a *literal description* of how anger works.

Let us now turn to Seneca. Tellingly, the only context in which the Latin philosopher uses the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor chimes in perfectly with the Lucretian passage above. In *de ira* 2, 19, 1, Seneca is describing the Stoic view of emotions, which are again seen as determined by movements of elements within the soul: much like in the Epicurean approach, differences in mood and temperament are explained in terms of their variable mingling (Riggsby 2015: 113). Also within the Stoic perspective, then, a predominance of heat over the other elements will produce 'wrathful men', in the form of boiling blood around the heart that renders the breast *calidissimum*:

(12) *Iracundos* ***fervida*** *animi natura faciet, est enim actuosus et pertinax ignis; frigidi mixtura timidos facit, pigrum est enim contractumque frigus. Volunt itaque quidam ex nostris* ***iram in pectore moveri effervescente circa cor sanguine****; causa cur hic potissimum adsignetur irae locus non alia est, quam quod in toto corpore* ***calidissimum*** *pectus est.*
'A fiery constitution of mind will produce wrathful men, for fire is active and stubborn; a mixture of cold makes cowards, for cold is sluggish and shrunken. Consequently, some of our school hold that anger is aroused in the breast by the boiling of the blood about the heart; the reason why this particular spot is assigned to anger is none other than the fact that the warmest part of the whole body is the breast' (Sen. *de ira* 2, 19, 2-4)

Also in this case, the embodied metaphor derives directly from the philosophical conception of anger championed by Seneca. As Riggsby (2015: 119) notes, the Latin author draws here on a precise scientific theory – which, incidentally, also serves to increase his persuasiveness and credibility throughout his readership, possibly

functioning as what cognitive anthropology defines a *folk model*, that is, a naïve understanding of some domain of experience (Short 2019: 82).

Now, the idea of the soul as materially composed of an admixture of elements derives from Hippocratic medicine, and the conception of anger as a warm boiling liquid enclosed in the body was formulated in philosophy as early as by Aristotle, as can be seen in his description of the physicist's embodied view of anger (see Fowler 1997 for a discussion):

> Hence a physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a dialectician: the latter would define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as **a boiling of the blood** or **warm substance surrounding the heart**. The one assigns the **material conditions**, the other the form or account; for what he states is the account of the fact, though for its actual existence there must be **embodiment of it in a material** such as is described by the other. (Arist. *De anima,* 1, 1, 403a, trans. by J. A. Smith)

We may thus conclude that the embodied conceptualization of ANGER as A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER ultimately originated in Greek physiological doctrines and then entered Latin through the Epicurean and Stoic philosophy, which integrated aspects drawn from Greek physiology. It emerged as a technical image within a specific literary genre and then circulated within a circumscribed discourse tradition. When the link with the scientific theory from which it emanated got lost, it was gradually incorporated into the language and presumably reinterpreted as a conventional metaphor by later authors. It is undoubtedly Seneca, and not Lucretius (whose work got lost and was then re-discovered by Poggio Bracciolini in the Renaissance), who guaranteed the spread and diachronic persistence of this metaphor over the centuries – along with Aristotelian and Stoic source texts that transmitted these aspects of Classical thought in the medieval culture (see Verbeke 1983; see also Ingham 2016 for an updated synopsis). Seneca first became an essential point of reference in the syncretic and eclectic view adopted by St. Augustine; in turn, St. Augustine's *City of God* was the only extended discussion on emotions inherited by the Latin Christian West (King 2010). A very interesting study by Geeraerts & Grondelaers (1995) completes the story, neatly illustrating how the medieval physiological-psychological theory of the four humours, which is coherent with the physiological view of emotions held by Epicureanism and by Stoicism, corroborated the productivity of this metaphor in the Modern era, ultimately highlighting "the possible role of cultural traditions as a source of emotion concepts" (1995: 155).

In conclusion, a corpus-based approach combined with an assessment of the contextual and cultural factors embedded in the textual dimension constitutes an instructive method to assess the nature and status of metaphors in ancient texts. The case analyzed here reveals yet another possible path along which metaphors first emerge in conceptualization and then in language, that is, as deliberate, but literal expressions which result from an act of individual creation to frame an abstract concept on the basis of a precise theoretical view. The history of the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor shows that a technical image can become a metaphor when its philosophical underpinning gradually bleaches, which in turn sets it off on its journey towards conventionalization, or, better, its "career" from an individual creation to a common way of expression. According to Prandi (2017: 210), such a career takes shape precisely at the moment when a technical concept becomes "part of the common

heritage of lexical contents and shared concepts", as this interesting case documents. This probably happened between Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages; however, more detailed research is needed to accurately reconstruct the career of this metaphor in later periods, and the present analysis still requires further investigation.

4. Concluding remarks

In this paper I have tried to distinguish between different types of metaphor whose status is defined by the interaction of three main parameters – deliberateness, creativity, and conventionality. I have also discussed possible strategies to identify them and distinguish one from another in ancient texts, highlighting the relationships holding between the different types.

Although the vast majority of metaphors produced and processed in ordinary language are conceptual, and as such escape our notice, sometimes speakers (or writers) explicitly call attention to the source domain, thus inviting the receiver to actively engage in the interpretation process and to reconsider a new, original view of the target domain – thus assigning to such metaphors, termed 'deliberate', a specific *communicative* function. Now, deliberate metaphors are typically living; they are not recognized as part of the conventional repertoire of expression but intentionally moulded by the creativity of the individual. This, however, is not always the case: also conceptual metaphors can be used to draw attention to the target domain and be explicitly signalled, as we have seen in the passage by Seneca given in (6). Cases like these clearly show that the property of deliberateness is conceptually independent from that of creativity.

The types of metaphor we have discussed can be placed along a notional continuum, ranging from purely conventional expressions that are not even recognized as figures to fully intentional, explicitly flagged ones. We have also discussed another path of metaphorization, whose point of departure is a technical expression, deliberately created as part of some scientific theory and which can be detected through a careful inspection of texts. As we have seen, if spread outside the specialized literary genre where they were first deliberately shaped, such technical images can become part of the common linguistic and conceptual heritage.

In technical language, creative associations can 'valorize' the source domain as a means of epistemic access to the target domain, thus conveying a new way of understanding it (on this point, see Prandi 2017: 200-201). It is thus possible to open up a new path of conceptual innovation and then reshape the novel concept as a consistent one. Our semantic inventories are presumably rich in similar and yet unexplored cases waiting to be discovered and investigated.

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